In R (Modaresi) v SSH [2011] EWCA Civ 1359 it was decided that the where the tribunal office is closed on the 14th day of the s2 eligibility period, the period is extended to include the next day that it is open.
I heard someone say recently that this principle applies to all eligibility periods, including, say, the initial six-month s3 period. I’d never thought of that before but it makes some sense.
It definitely makes sense for the NR’s post-barring 28-day application period. Section 3 cases are arguably different in that you have a new eligibility the next day – and it might not make sense to be “doubly eligible” in the overlapping period – though a patient would be better off being able to use the first right to apply.
It makes sense as otherwise the patient is essentially losing a day or two to appeal if the deadline falls on a non working day (and possibly more if there is a bank holiday or two thrown in the mix) and it can’t have been intended for patients to have less time to appeal in these circumstances.
Rule 12(2) of the HESC procedure rules states: “If the time specified by these Rules, a practice direction or a direction for doing any act ends on a day other than a working day, the act is done in time if it is done on the next working day.” So this would cover anything in the rules eg applications to reinstate a withdrawn appeal.
I thought there was something similar in the MHA itself but I of course can’t find that now. I did wonder if it might be elsewhere eg the Interpretation Act 1978 but I couldn’t see it there either.
Yes I think that’s right Jonathan. I was once brought in very late in a s41 conditional discharge case where the 2-year eligibility period had just expired but the last day had fallen on a bank holiday. I made submissions on Modaresi and after a couple of days (possibly after legal advice) the Tribunal agreed to treat the application as falling within the previous period.
As Deborah states - for non-MHA timeframes it’s codified in the TPR.
I think it must be correct if you look at the underlying logic in Mucelli and Pritaum Kaur:
“when a time is prescribed by statute for doing any act, and that act can only be done if the court office is open on the day when time expires, then, if it turns out … that the day is a Sunday or other dies non, the time is extended until the next day on which the court office is open”
“Any act” does a lot of heavy lifting here, especially as each application within each eligibility is a distinct entitlement.