Where does Cheshire West No. 2 and "valid consent" leave CD(Dep)?

I’m still digesting the new UKSC case, but it sounds like CD(Dep) provisions are almost completely dead in the water as currently interpreted by the FtT.

Cheshire West established an objective test about whether restrictions constitute a DoL. That reasoning was imported into MM at [47]. Now there is an objective and subjective test with a multifactorial approach, and if someone provides “valid consent” to the arrangements, it wouldn’t (or at least, is very unlikely to) constitute a DoL. The class of patient who the FtT currently deem as suitable for CD(Dep) provisions have “capacity” and are consenting to the arrangements - which is a fully informed decision far above the required concept of “valid consent”. Is it even possible to have a DoL for this class of patients anymore?

The bright side might be that those under civil sections with capacity to agree to restrictions might now have parity with their restricted counterparts.

I haven’t looked at the new case yet, but from memory the cases about tribunal discharge all took it for granted that accepting the Hobson’s choice of being deprived of your liberty outside hospital wasn’t valid consent for Article 5 purposes.

The MOJ and MHT interpretation that the new deprivation of liberty conditions cannot be enforced except by recall, and so agreement is at all times required, is daft but is a separate issue (Enforceability of new deprivation of liberty conditional discharge - #13 by Jonathan).

Shackling ourselves to the European Convention instead of just writing our own laws is the source of all these problems.

I think you’re correct, Jonathan, but both MM and PJ were decided (at all appellate levels) in the context of the objective test in Cheshire West. It’s the entire premise for the UKSC decision. In the 2007 R(SH) case, the J decided that a medication condition did not engage a patient’s Article 8(1) rights because, irrespective of the foreseeable consequences of recall, they remained free to choose whether to comply or not.

That, it seems to me, can be drawn across to CD(Dep). In terms of the multifactorial approach, the patient remains free to choose whether to comply or not. Where a patient has capacity, agrees to supervision, restrictions and would otherwise remain in hospital indefinitely - Art 5 might not be engaged at all except in the most coercive of regimes (which the FtT currently don’t endorse as being appropriate for patients that are not agreeable/compliant).

If nothing else, I think it’s narrowed the utility of CD(Dep) significantly.

I’m not sure I agree. What I was trying to argue in the other topic is that the new power to impose deprivation of liberty conditions is different to other conditions, and is sufficient to authorise actual deprivation of liberty (including its enforcement on a day-to-day basis).

I really should read this new judgment before commenting further. But here goes! My instinct is that the agreement of a detained patient to continue to be deprived of his liberty on conditional discharge outside hospital probably isn’t Article 5 valid consent… though here’s some stuff I wrote back in 2013 which suggests arguments to the contrary.

In relation to the subjective element, the Upper Tribunal (UT) stated in SSJ v RB (2010) that a detained patient cannot validly consent to a discharge regime which amounts to continued deprivation of liberty.[1] A patient seeking discharge could argue that this is not binding on the MHT on the basis that (a) the UT statement was strictly obiter and the Court of Appeal did not consider consent; (b) in its reasoning, the UT referred to a case which stated ‘[a] deprivation remains since the consent cannot convert [it] into something else’, which is clearly wrong in light of Storck;[2] (c) the UT noted that the two choices offered (conditional discharge or continued detention) ‘cannot be equated to a free and unfettered consent’: in doing so it did not apply the correct test (of ‘valid consent’) and was being unworldly in not realising that ‘free and unfettered consent’ rarely exists for psychiatric patients; and (d) a condition that a patient ‘shall comply with medication’ is treated as being obeyed voluntarily,[3] and it appears that the UT were not referred to this analogous case.


[1] SSJ v RB [2010] UKUT 343 (AAC) [60]-[62].
[2] G (n110) [23].
[3] R (SH) v MHRT [2007] EWHC 884 (Admin).

I’ve just finished reading it. Phew!

Well, it provided an interpretation of the objective element, but the whole idea of the objective and subjective elements is from Storck, well before Cheshire West.

Again, the objective/subjective elements are from Storck, and the “multifactorial” approach (if not that name) goes all the way back to Guzzardi, so are not new things in the AGNI case.

I don’t think what the AGNI case decided on the subjective element (that, contrary to what we all thought a decade ago, Article 5 “valid consent”, meaning no DOL, can be given by someone lacking the relevant capacity in our domestic law) really changes anything for conditional discharge. Everybody, I think, has proceeded on the basis that the Hobson’s choice presented to the patient (get out this way or not at all) means it just can’t be valid consent. That could still be wrong, but I don’t think the AGNI case changes it.

What was decided about the objective element (in particular, that compliance, normality and purpose are relevant) seems more relevant but I’m pretty sure even applying those factors to an “only leave with an escort” conditional discharge for the protection of the public the conclusion would be that there’s an Article 5 confinement.

I don’t think the tribunal’s approach does differentiate between patients with and without the relevant capacity, but between patients who agree and those who object (interestingly, that’s quite similar to the AGNI position in some respects). But, anyway, we get back to the question of whether the context means there can be “valid consent”.

I’m not sure about any of this so would welcome any reply!

Let’s say you have been detained under a restricted hospital order for a few years after committing a serious criminal offence. The only way you can live anywhere except psychiatric hospital is a conditional discharge with a condition that you must never leave the accommodation without two escorts, for the protection of other people. In practice you know you have to be compliant with this, as you’ll be recalled back to hospital as soon as you try to leave (whether or not they are willing to enforce the condition physically to prevent you from leaving). So you agree to the escort condition and are happy to be leaving hospital.

Are you being confined? “The starting point in assessing whether someone has been deprived of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.” (AGNI para 53(i)). Well, you’ll probably be in some sort of mental health aftercare accommodation, with staff present 24 hours a day (ready to enforce the rules), nurses administering medication, probably other patients, doctors visiting etc. The escort condition will apply indefinitely, possibly for the rest of your life. The effect is that you know you must either remain in the accommodation, leaving only with escorts, or return to hospital detention. The manner of implementation probably includes what we discussed in the other topic (whether you’ll be physically restrained from leaving, or recalled within 10 minutes and subsequently picked up by the police) but the effect of either, from your own point of view, is similar. Look at the patient in Ashingdane v UK – he was keen to get out of Broadmoor and to Oakwood hospital, where he ended up with unlimited unescorted leave (just be in bed at night) and Thursday–Sunday weekend leave, but was still “deprived of his liberty” there. Some form of “coercion” is necessary (AGNI paras 146, 187) but I think consideration of the effects and manner of implementation demonstrates that there is coercion.

And what about “valid consent”? English cases have said that you’re not being presented with a real choice (RB) and that conditional discharge residence conditions aren’t voluntary for ordinary residence purposes (Wiltshire). I think those things are right. I think the fact that the conditional discharge is to protect the public and would potentially need to be enforced (to protect the public) if you no longer complied means the courts are likely to say there is no scope for valid consent, whether you have the relevant capacity in domestic law or not. It’s a step removed from prison and psychiatric hospital, but not that far, and “valid consent” doesn’t count for much there – you’re still going to be subject to the same regime. In practical terms, the condition needs to be identified as DOL or non-DOL at the outset: this affects subsequent reference and application periods, and there’s no clear way to change that designation just because you change your mind.

The answer when amending the MHA really should have been to focus on the thing to be achieved – detaining the patient outside hospital and only allowing him to leave when escorted, or only allowing him out with permission, or whatever the case may be – and providing for that sort of condition and its enforcement. Then whether it could be described as an Article 5 “deprivation of liberty” or not would only be relevant later if challenged, and the various new safeguards should show compliance with Article 5’s requirements. An example of doing it the right way is MHA detention (which provides for detention in hospital in an Article 5 compliant way, but isn’t affected by whether or not the patient provides Article 5 “valid consent”) and an example of doing it the wrong way is MCA detention (which provides for Article 5 “deprivation of liberty” in care homes and hospitals, and so is at the mercy of ill-defined concepts, including “valid consent”).