Where does Cheshire West No. 2 and "valid consent" leave CD(Dep)? And CTOs?

I’m still digesting the new UKSC case, but it sounds like CD(Dep) provisions are almost completely dead in the water as currently interpreted by the FtT.

Cheshire West established an objective test about whether restrictions constitute a DoL. That reasoning was imported into MM at [47]. Now there is an objective and subjective test with a multifactorial approach, and if someone provides “valid consent” to the arrangements, it wouldn’t (or at least, is very unlikely to) constitute a DoL. The class of patient who the FtT currently deem as suitable for CD(Dep) provisions have “capacity” and are consenting to the arrangements - which is a fully informed decision far above the required concept of “valid consent”. Is it even possible to have a DoL for this class of patients anymore?

The bright side might be that those under civil sections with capacity to agree to restrictions might now have parity with their restricted counterparts.

I haven’t looked at the new case yet, but from memory the cases about tribunal discharge all took it for granted that accepting the Hobson’s choice of being deprived of your liberty outside hospital wasn’t valid consent for Article 5 purposes.

The MOJ and MHT interpretation that the new deprivation of liberty conditions cannot be enforced except by recall, and so agreement is at all times required, is daft but is a separate issue (Enforceability of new deprivation of liberty conditional discharge - #13 by Jonathan).

Shackling ourselves to the European Convention instead of just writing our own laws is the source of all these problems.

I think you’re correct, Jonathan, but both MM and PJ were decided (at all appellate levels) in the context of the objective test in Cheshire West. It’s the entire premise for the UKSC decision. In the 2007 R(SH) case, the J decided that a medication condition did not engage a patient’s Article 8(1) rights because, irrespective of the foreseeable consequences of recall, they remained free to choose whether to comply or not.

That, it seems to me, can be drawn across to CD(Dep). In terms of the multifactorial approach, the patient remains free to choose whether to comply or not. Where a patient has capacity, agrees to supervision, restrictions and would otherwise remain in hospital indefinitely - Art 5 might not be engaged at all except in the most coercive of regimes (which the FtT currently don’t endorse as being appropriate for patients that are not agreeable/compliant).

If nothing else, I think it’s narrowed the utility of CD(Dep) significantly.

I’m not sure I agree. What I was trying to argue in the other topic is that the new power to impose deprivation of liberty conditions is different to other conditions, and is sufficient to authorise actual deprivation of liberty (including its enforcement on a day-to-day basis).

I really should read this new judgment before commenting further. But here goes! My instinct is that the agreement of a detained patient to continue to be deprived of his liberty on conditional discharge outside hospital probably isn’t Article 5 valid consent… though here’s some stuff I wrote back in 2013 which suggests arguments to the contrary.

In relation to the subjective element, the Upper Tribunal (UT) stated in SSJ v RB (2010) that a detained patient cannot validly consent to a discharge regime which amounts to continued deprivation of liberty.[1] A patient seeking discharge could argue that this is not binding on the MHT on the basis that (a) the UT statement was strictly obiter and the Court of Appeal did not consider consent; (b) in its reasoning, the UT referred to a case which stated ‘[a] deprivation remains since the consent cannot convert [it] into something else’, which is clearly wrong in light of Storck;[2] (c) the UT noted that the two choices offered (conditional discharge or continued detention) ‘cannot be equated to a free and unfettered consent’: in doing so it did not apply the correct test (of ‘valid consent’) and was being unworldly in not realising that ‘free and unfettered consent’ rarely exists for psychiatric patients; and (d) a condition that a patient ‘shall comply with medication’ is treated as being obeyed voluntarily,[3] and it appears that the UT were not referred to this analogous case.


[1] SSJ v RB [2010] UKUT 343 (AAC) [60]-[62].
[2] G (n110) [23].
[3] R (SH) v MHRT [2007] EWHC 884 (Admin).

I’ve just finished reading it. Phew!

Well, it provided an interpretation of the objective element, but the whole idea of the objective and subjective elements is from Storck, well before Cheshire West.

Again, the objective/subjective elements are from Storck, and the “multifactorial” approach (if not that name) goes all the way back to Guzzardi, so are not new things in the AGNI case.

I don’t think what the AGNI case decided on the subjective element (that, contrary to what we all thought a decade ago, Article 5 “valid consent”, meaning no DOL, can be given by someone lacking the relevant capacity in our domestic law) really changes anything for conditional discharge. Everybody, I think, has proceeded on the basis that the Hobson’s choice presented to the patient (get out this way or not at all) means it just can’t be valid consent. That could still be wrong, but I don’t think the AGNI case changes it.

What was decided about the objective element (in particular, that compliance, normality and purpose are relevant) seems more relevant but I’m pretty sure even applying those factors to an “only leave with an escort” conditional discharge for the protection of the public the conclusion would be that there’s an Article 5 confinement.

I don’t think the tribunal’s approach does differentiate between patients with and without the relevant capacity, but between patients who agree and those who object (interestingly, that’s quite similar to the AGNI position in some respects). But, anyway, we get back to the question of whether the context means there can be “valid consent”.

I’m not sure about any of this so would welcome any reply!

Let’s say you have been detained under a restricted hospital order for a few years after committing a serious criminal offence. The only way you can live anywhere except psychiatric hospital is a conditional discharge with a condition that you must never leave the accommodation without two escorts, for the protection of other people. In practice you know you have to be compliant with this, as you’ll be recalled back to hospital as soon as you try to leave (whether or not they are willing to enforce the condition physically to prevent you from leaving). So you agree to the escort condition and are happy to be leaving hospital.

Are you being confined? “The starting point in assessing whether someone has been deprived of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.” (AGNI para 53(i)). Well, you’ll probably be in some sort of mental health aftercare accommodation, with staff present 24 hours a day (ready to enforce the rules), nurses administering medication, probably other patients, doctors visiting etc. The escort condition will apply indefinitely, possibly for the rest of your life. The effect is that you know you must either remain in the accommodation, leaving only with escorts, or return to hospital detention. The manner of implementation probably includes what we discussed in the other topic (whether you’ll be physically restrained from leaving, or recalled within 10 minutes and subsequently picked up by the police) but the effect of either, from your own point of view, is similar. Look at the patient in Ashingdane v UK – he was keen to get out of Broadmoor and to Oakwood hospital, where he ended up with unlimited unescorted leave (just be in bed at night) and Thursday–Sunday weekend leave, but was still “deprived of his liberty” there. Some form of “coercion” is necessary (AGNI paras 146, 187) but I think consideration of the effects and manner of implementation demonstrates that there is coercion.

And what about “valid consent”? English cases have said that you’re not being presented with a real choice (RB) and that conditional discharge residence conditions aren’t voluntary for ordinary residence purposes (Wiltshire). I think those things are right. I think the fact that the conditional discharge is to protect the public and would potentially need to be enforced (to protect the public) if you no longer complied means the courts are likely to say there is no scope for valid consent, whether you have the relevant capacity in domestic law or not. It’s a step removed from prison and psychiatric hospital, but not that far, and “valid consent” doesn’t count for much there – you’re still going to be subject to the same regime. In practical terms, the condition needs to be identified as DOL or non-DOL at the outset: this affects subsequent reference and application periods, and there’s no clear way to change that designation just because you change your mind.

The answer when amending the MHA really should have been to focus on the thing to be achieved – detaining the patient outside hospital and only allowing him to leave when escorted, or only allowing him out with permission, or whatever the case may be – and providing for that sort of condition and its enforcement. Then whether it could be described as an Article 5 “deprivation of liberty” or not would only be relevant later if challenged, and the various new safeguards should show compliance with Article 5’s requirements. An example of doing it the right way is MHA detention (which provides for detention in hospital in an Article 5 compliant way, but isn’t affected by whether or not the patient provides Article 5 “valid consent”) and an example of doing it the wrong way is MCA detention (which provides for Article 5 “deprivation of liberty” in care homes and hospitals, and so is at the mercy of ill-defined concepts, including “valid consent”).

This may be a silly question but do we think that someone who has capacity and is not restricted can consent to an escorting provision? I assume that the same arguments apply as with restricted patients and that the answer is probably no.

I’m not sure it’s as clear cut as yes or no. It depends whether the person is genuinely and validly consenting to it. Even in the example Jonathan gives, the framing makes all the difference. On one hand, a patient might appreciate their risk, doesn’t want to venture out alone, and continues to give ongoing consent. On the other, their agreement might just be acquiescence to the “least bad option” to make it coercive confinement.

Another factor is the relative normality of the placement which might be significantly different to the “paradigm of imprisonment”. Yet others will be the effect, manner and duration which could be more indicative of a DoL if they require escorts in the community.

I still think the scope has decreased, but maybe not so considerably.

With conditional discharge the tribunal could square the circle by adopting a policy that all escort conditions are (even now) DOL conditions. Maybe by saying that the patient is being confined by coercion (either in practice or, at least, by the recall threat) and in the circumstances cannot give valid consent. But it mightn’t be that simple when CTO patients are arguing to the contrary in similar circumstances:

  • Restricted patients can be discharged no matter what, but is beneficial for an escort or “don’t leave without permission” condition to be treated as a “DOL” condition because of the shorter application and reference periods.

  • As Karen had in mind, unrestricted patients will now want to argue that similar conditions are not “DOL” conditions, so that they can get out of hospital subject to those conditions, and they’ll make the arguments Zac mentioned.

For reasons unknown to myself my mind ran on what happened in the throes of the COVID pandemic. I signed forms to say I consented to jabs.

In reality, I was forced to sign. If I didn’t sign I couldn’t work, couldn’t fly abroad etc. If I had ‘free choice’ I would not have ‘agreed’ to the jabs, for scientific reasons not shared by a majority.

So I took their jabs - officially I was ‘of capacity’ and ‘agreed’ - which equals consent.

Coercion seems to be silent in the background of many ‘agreements’, not just for COVID jabs. No one is there to audit autonomy.

Hi,

A Tribunal has, in the last week, decided that there is no dol for a person on conditional discharge who can only go out with an escort. Because he consents. The fictional example you used, Jonathan, on 9 Jul above is an almost exact description of the situation.

So, there’s the answer. At the moment.

At risk of mixing up geometric shapes I am going round in circles trying to square the circle. How does this fit with the comment in para 90 of the Bournewood decision?

The Court recalls that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of Convention protection for the single reason that he may have given himself up to be taken into detention (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, §§ 64-65), especially when it is not disputed that that person is legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action.

So- you can’t consent to detention and avoid dol, but if you consent it isn’t detention in the first place? Joseph Heller would be proud, because that is quite some catch.

Hi All

This is a really interesting conversation, but i must admit that the MHA is not something i am in anyway specialised in, so some of what i say below may be off the mark, but i hope you don’t mind if i add a few observations generally about the AGNI decision and Jonathan’s and Nick’s scenarios:

  • I think ‘valid consent’ for the purposes of article 5 is a complete red herring after AGNI, and people should run a mile from it when considering DoL, for the following reasons:
    • The starting points is, is the person confined (objective element) for which a persons objection is key in considering this question (paras 151 and 187 of judgment are helpful) - if no confinement the question of valid consent (subjective element) is irrelevant/falls away - because it is whether there is valid consent to the confinement. As explained by the DHSC: "It should be noted that the issue of whether a person is objecting to the confinement is relevant to the question of the objective deprivation of liberty. Where a person is objecting, then it follows that valid consent is unlikely to be present. If there is an absence of objection when the person is capable of objecting, then it is more likely that the person is not being confined […] Any objection would point towards a deprivation of liberty" (UK Supreme Court 2026 judgment on what constitutes a deprivation of liberty - GOV.UK). See also the talk here from Ben Troke (lawyer) who reaches the same conclusion - What the Supreme Court’s Deprivation of Liberty judgment means for Social Care | SCIE Webinar 2026 - SCIE… Alex Ruck Keene (barrister specialising in Mental Capacity and Mental Health Law) put it like this “[…] at its heart the idea that deprivation of liberty is the exercise of compulsion to overcome a person’s will to require them to be somewhere they do not wish to be.” I would maybe add “and/or to receive care or treatment that they do not want to receive”. In short, for a person to be ‘confined’ there must be evidence of compulsion to overcome a persons will, and where that is the case there would be clearly no evidence of valid consent to that confinement. If no compulsion/coercion, there would be no confinement, meaning there is no confinement for a person to validly consent to.
    • Although the element of an escort in Jonathan’s and Nick’s scenario is of course important, there would be further considerations about the ‘nature’ and ‘manner’ of the escort as well as the wider restrictions / controls being imposed, for example, is there evidence of any of the following:
      • Sedation to manage behaviour (para 188) – especially if also provided covertly or with force
      • Physical restraint to deliver care, manage dysregulation or protect P from harm (para 54)
      • Person is indicating a desire to leave and is/would be stopped (para 151 & 187)
      • Person is objecting to the care/placement arrangements (para 151 & 187)
      • Person is frequently secluded or confined to a particular area
      • Significant levels of supervision / control over movements / limited availability of social contacts (para 121) + they consider the restrictions as ‘a major intrusion in their life’ (para 136)?
    • I think the key question being in the example given by Nick and Jonathan being does the person consider or indicate verbally or through their behaviour that they see the restrictions as a major intrusion in their life (my gut feeling is compared from where they have just come from probably not?). If yes, that would likely evidence objection to care/placement/arrangements, meaning the person would be seen as objectively confined and would in and of itself indicate a lack of valid consent to the confinement (there is the element of compulsion/coercion present). If the person is ‘broadly happy’ with the care and support they receive or will be receiving and don’t see the support/controls as major restrictions, rather, something to help them and others stay safe in the home and in the community then this would point towards there not being a confinement and as such valid consent becomes irrelevant.
  • I would also add that the ‘multi-factorial’ approach is in reality solely about whether the person is confined, and is only indirectly relevant to the question of valid consent in situations where the multi-factorial approach has in-fact identified confinement (see paras 26, 53, 184, 190). Happy to be told i am wrong here though - but don’t take my happiness as a sign of valid consent :wink:
  • As such, based on Jonathan’s and Nick’s scenario it would appear to me that neither person would be seen as confined as the individual themselves does not object and seems to consider the restrictions far less restrictive to the confinement they had been under in hospital. As such, the question of valid consent would be irrelevant in these scenarios as they are not objectively confined… Maybe in your scenario Nick it is less no DoL “Because he consents”, but more “because he does not see the restrictions as a major intrusion in his life and not comparable to confinement in a prison cell” and hence ‘he’ is not objectively confined.

All feedback welcome here as i think we are still trying to learn after the AGNI ruling. I wanted to add again that the circumstances described are outside my normal area of work, i was more interested in the discussion about the objective and subjective elements of DoL and how that is considered post AGNI.

That’s a very interesting decision, I think. CD(Dep) provisions were legislated for this exact purpose (pre-AGNI) and provide greater oversight in terms of applications and references. If this is your case Nick, would your client consent to an anonymised published judgment being requested? Would be especially helpful if the Tribunal made findings specifically addressing limbs of the multifactorial test & what constitutes “valid consent” in this context.

I can imagine this distinction will be falling to the UT to determine in the not-so-distant future, but guidance will be a difficult task given how case-specific these issues are. It would almost make more sense for case law to develop in the CoP which we can import to MH but sadly we don’t have that luxury for the time being.

I’m quite sad that my Mental Health Act has been infected with the ECHR “deprivation of liberty” definition!

Yes, every tribunal will be making random (or fact-specific) decisions that aren’t binding on others.

This would be useful, and I could help if necessary.

An Open Justice blog has recently been published about a case mirroring the discussions above. It’s an interesting read.

What happens to restricted patients after AGNI? SJ Hilder considers the consequences – Promoting Open Justice in the Court of Protection

Hi Zac

As i said in my earlier post this is an area outside of my working knowledge, but my reading of the post, and thanks for sharing, is no one thinks P is confined so no DoL, but the Judge and everyone else seems unsure of the workaround in this situation… Is that a correct interpretation and if so what do you all think would be the work around?

This reminded me of an old Private Eye article: Private Eye, ‘Catch 22’ (issue 1277, 10-23 December 2010).

It was simpler before anyone had eaten from the tree of the knowledge of deprivation of liberty. The patient was happy to get out of hospital, the risks could be addressed, and nobody saw any problem. The ECHR case law doesn’t add up, and Cheshire West just temporarily shielded us from it. We need the confidence to pass our own legislation to address any concerns (e.g. safeguards relating to conditions not to leave without permission or without an escort) without it being tethered to ECHR jurisprudence.

I’ve finally had a chance to read Ministry of Justice, ‘Supreme Court Judgement - AGNI’ (July 2026). It’s clear that they aren’t trying to make a special case for conditional discharge. The courts’ previous concerns (see above) were likely because the MOJ had been arguing that no patient (even with capacity) could provide valid consent. I imagine tribunals and courts will go along with the new approach too. Here’s an extract:

The Secretary of State notes the DHSCs position that following the judgment it is anticipated that fewer people will fall in scope of the DoLS. Notwithstanding that the part III MHA 1983 context differs (including that it may sometimes be closer to ‘the paradigm case of confinement in a cell’ as described in the AGNI judgment) a similar expectation is anticipated for Supervised Discharge where it has always been the presumption it will be used infrequently and for small numbers of patients.

It deals with the practical problems this way:

Additional scrutiny to determine that a patient continues to consent will also need to be considered and similarly documented throughout the discharge of consenting patients, in line with DHSC policy.

Looks like the answer is Yes. It’ll just be a question of convincing the tribunal there’s no Article 5 deprivation of liberty.

At first glance that conclusion seems inevitable from the tribunal simultaneously saying:

  1. “The relevant question to ask in each case is whether the patient either agrees with (or at least does not object to) the condition which deprives them of their liberty. If they do object to it, then it is unlikely they will comply with it and so it should not be imposed” (Mental Health Tribunal, ‘MHA 2025 - an introduction to the new conditional discharge provisions’ (10 February 2026), page 3).
  2. The patient’s consent can be Article 5 “valid consent”, which means there is no deprivation of liberty (Nick’s case above).

But maybe in some cases the two things can’t be equated. For example, maybe the patient says he will go along with the escort condition but if he had a free choice he would not – the tribunal could decide that he would likely comply (so the condition can be imposed) but that there is coercion and confinement and/or he isn’t giving Article 5 valid consent (so it would need to be a “DOL” condition).

A tribunal could probably toss a coin in any case and justify either conclusion.

The MOJ’s recent position is that the new power can be used (Ministry of Justice, ‘Supreme Court Judgement - AGNI’ (July 2026), page 2).

Where the proposed conditions of care and treatment in the community amount to confinement and the patient does not consent to the proposed conditions, Supervised Discharge may still be used to enable the patient’s safe discharge from hospital, where this is necessary to protect the public from serious harm.